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1. Introduction
One of the most persistent themes in the literature on beha-
vioural queueing theory is the sub-optimality of greedy or
‘selﬁsh’ customer behaviour in the context of overall social
welfare. In order to induce the most favourable scenario for
society as a whole, customers are typically required to deviate
in some way from the actions that they would choose if they
were motivated only by their own interests. This principle has
been observed in many of the classical queueing system
models, including M/M/1, GI/M/1, GI/M/s and others (see, eg,
Naor, 1969; Yechiali, 1971; Knudsen, 1972; Yechiali, 1972;
Littlechild, 1974; Edelson and Hildebrand, 1975; Lippman and
Stidham, 1977; Stidham, 1978). More recently, this theme has
been explored in applications including queues with setup and
closedown times (Sun et al, 2010), queues with server break-
downs and delayed repairs (Wang and Zhang, 2011), vacation
queues with partial information (Guo and Li, 2013), queues
with compartmented waiting space (Economou and Kanta,
2008) and routing in public services (Knight et al, 2012;
Knight and Harper, 2013). More generally, the implications
of selﬁsh and social decision making have been studied in
various applications of economics and computer science;
Roughgarden’s (2005) monograph provides an overview of this
work and poses some open problems.
The ﬁrst author to compare ‘self-optimization’ with ‘overall
optimization’ in a queueing setting was Naor (1969), whose
classical model consists of anM/M/1 system with linear waiting
costs and a ﬁxed service value. The general queueing system
that we consider in this paper may be regarded as an extension
of Naor’s model to a higher-dimensional space. We consider a
system with N⩾ 2 heterogeneous service facilities in parallel,
each of which has its own queue and operates with a cost and
reward structure similar to that of Naor’s single-server model
(see Figure 1). In addition, we generalize the system by
assuming that each facility i may serve up to ci customers
simultaneously, so that we are essentially considering a network
of non-identicalM/M/ci queues.
The inspiration for our work is derived primarily from
public service settings in which customers may receive
service at any one of a number of different locations. For
example, in a healthcare setting, patients requiring a
particular operation procedure might choose between var-
ious different healthcare providers (or a choice might be
made on their behalf by a central authority). In this context,
the ith provider is able to treat up to ci patients at once, and
any further arrivals are required to join a waiting list, or
seek treatment elsewhere. A further application of this work
involves the queueing process at immigration control at
ports and/or airports. These queues are often centrally
controlled by an ofﬁcer aiming to ensure that congestion is
reduced. Finally, computer data trafﬁc provides yet another
application of this work. When transferring packets of data
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over a network, there arise instances at which choices of
available servers can have a major impact on the efﬁcacy of
the entire network.
The queueing system that we consider in this work evolves
stochastically according to transitions which we assume are
governed by Markovian distributions. We address the problem
of ﬁnding an optimal routing and admission control policy and
model this as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (see, eg,
Puterman, 1994) for a complete description and rigorous
theoretical treatment of MDPs). Stidham and Weber (1993)
provide an overview of MDP models for the control of
queueing networks. It is well-known that optimal policies for
the allocation of customers to parallel heterogeneous queues are
not easy to characterize; for this reason, heuristic approaches
have been developed which have achieved promising results in
applications (see Argon et al, 2009; Glazebrook et al, 2009). In
attempting to identify or approximate an optimal policy, one
aims to ﬁnd a dynamic decision-making scheme which opti-
mizes the overall performance of the system with respect to a
given criterion; we refer to such a scheme as a socially optimal
solution to the optimization problem associated with the MDP.
In this paper our objective is to draw inferences about the
nature of a socially optimal solution from the structure of the
corresponding selﬁshly optimal solution. A selﬁshly optimal
solution may be regarded as a simple heuristic rule which
optimizes a customer’s immediate outcome without giving due
consideration to long-term consequences. The remaining sec-
tions in this paper are organized as follows:
● In Section 2 we provide anMDP formulation of our queueing
system and deﬁne all of the input parameters. We also offer an
alternative formulation and show that it is equivalent.
● In Section 3 we deﬁne ‘selﬁshly optimal’ and ‘socially
optimal’ policies in more detail. We then show that our
model satisﬁes certain conditions which imply the existence
of a stationary socially optimal policy, and prove an
important relationship between the structures of the selﬁshly
and socially optimal policies.
● In Section 4 we draw comparisons between the results of
Section 3 and known results for systems of unobservable
queues.
● In Section 5 we show that the results of Section 3 hold when
customers are divided into an arbitrary number of hetero-
geneous classes. These classes are heterogeneous with
respect to demand rates, holding costs and service values,
but not service rates.
● Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the results of this paper and
possible avenues for future research.
2. Model formulation
We consider a queueing system with N service facilities.
Customers arrive from a single demand node according to a
stationary Poisson process with demand rate λ> 0. Let
facility i (for i= 1, 2,…, N) have ci identical service chan-
nels, a linear holding cost βi> 0 per customer per unit time,
and a ﬁxed value of service (or ﬁxed reward) αi> 0. Service
times at any server of facility i are assumed to be exponen-
tially distributed with mean μi
− 1. We assume αi⩾ βi/μi for
each facility i in order to avoid degenerate cases where the
reward for service fails to compensate for the expected costs
accrued during a service time. When a customer arrives, they
can proceed to one of the N facilities or, alternatively, exit
from the system without receiving service (referred to as
balking). Thus, there are N + 1 possible decisions that can be
made upon a customer’s arrival. The decision chosen is
assumed to be irrevocable; we do not allow reneging or
jockeying between queues. The queue discipline at each
facility is ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served (FCFS). A diagrammatic
representation of the system is given in Figure 1.
We deﬁne S :¼ fx ¼ ðx1; x2; :::xNÞ : x1; x2; :::; xN 2 N0g to
be the state space of our system, where xi (the ith component of
the vector x) is the number of customers present (including
those in service and those waiting in the queue) at facility i.
λ
1
2
1
2
N
2
N
1
N
Figure 1 A diagrammatic representation of the queueing system.
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It is assumed that the system state is always known and can be
used to inform decision making.
No binding assumption is made in this paper as to whether
decisions are made by individual customers themselves, or
whether actions are chosen on their behalf by a central
controller. It is natural to suppose that selﬁsh decision making
occurs in the former case, whereas socially optimal behaviour
requires some form of central control, and the discussion in this
paper will tend to be consistent with this viewpoint; however,
the results in this paper remain valid under alternative perspec-
tives (eg, socially optimal behaviour might arise from selﬂess
co-operation between customers).
We do not assume any upper bound on the value of λ in terms
of the other parameters. However, the types of policies that we
consider in this work always induce system stability. For
convenience, we will use the notation xi+ to denote the state
which is identical to x except that one extra customer is present
at facility i; similarly, when xi⩾ 1, we use xi− to denote the state
with one fewer customer present at facility i. That is:
xi + :¼ x + ei
xi - :¼ x - ei
where ei is the ith vector in the standard orthonormal basis
of RN :
Let us discretize the system by deﬁning:
Δ ¼ λ +
XN
i¼1
ciμi
 ! - 1
and considering an MDP which evolves in discrete time steps
of size Δ. Using the well-known technique of uniformization,
usually attributed to Lippman (1975) (see also Serfozo, 1979),
we can analyse the system within a discrete-time framework,
in which arrivals and service completions occur only at the
‘jump times’ of the discretized process. At any time step, the
probability that a customer arrives is λΔ, and the probability
that a service completes at facility i is either ciμiΔ or xiμiΔ,
depending on whether or not all of the channels at facility i are
in use. At each time step, an action a∈ {0, 1, 2,…,N} is chosen
which represents the destination of any customer who arrives at
that particular step; if a= 0 then the customer balks from the
system, and if a= i (for i∈ {1, 2,…,N}) then the customer
joins facility i. This leads to the following deﬁnition for the
transition probabilities pxy(a) for transferring from state x to y
in a single discrete time step, given that action a is chosen:
pxy að Þ ¼
λΔ; y ¼ xi + and a ¼ i≠ 0;
min xi; cið ÞμiΔ; y ¼ xi - ;
1 - I a≠ 0ð ÞλΔ + PN
i¼1
min xi; cið ÞμiΔ
 
; y ¼ x;
0; otherwise
8>>>><
>>>>:
Here we have used I to denote the indicator function. Since
the units of time can always be re-scaled, we may assumeΔ= 1
without loss of generality, and we therefore suppress Δ in the
remainder of this work. Figure 2 illustrates these transition
probabilities diagrammatically.
If the system is in some state x∈ S at a particular time step,
the sum of the holding costs incurred is Σi=1N βixi; meanwhile,
services are completing at an overall rate Σi=1N min(xi, ci)μi and
the value of service at facility i is αi. This leads to the following
deﬁnition for the single-step expected net reward r(x) asso-
ciated with being in state x at a particular time step:
r xð Þ :¼
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þαiμi - βixið Þ (1)
The system may be controlled by means of a policy which
determines, for each n 2 N0; the action an to be chosen after
n time steps. In this paper we focus on stationary non-
randomized policies, under which the action an is chosen
deterministically according to the accompanying system state
xn, and is not dependent on other factors (such as the history of
past states and actions, or the time index n). In Section 3 it will
be shown that it is always possible to ﬁnd a policy of the
aforementioned type which achieves optimality in our system.
Let xn and an be, respectively, the state of the system and
accompanying action chosen after n time steps, and let us use
θ to denote the stationary policy being followed. The long-run
average net reward gθ(x, r) per time step, given an initial state
x0= x and reward function r, is given by:
gθ x; rð Þ ¼ lim
t!1 t
- 1Eθ
Xt - 1
n¼0
r xnð Þ j x0 ¼ x
" #
(2)
where the dependence of xn on the previous state xn− 1 and
action an− 1 is implicit. Before proceeding, we will show that an
alternative deﬁnition of the reward function r yields the same
long-run average reward (assuming that the same policy is
followed). If a customer joins facility i under system state x,
then their individual expected net reward, taking into account
the expected waiting time, holding cost βi and value of service
αi, is given by αi− βi/μi if they begin service immediately, and
Figure 2 Transition probabilities (marked next to arrows) from an
arbitrary state x∈ S.
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αi− βi(xi+1)/(ciμi) otherwise. Given that the probability
of a customer arriving at any time step is λ, this suggests the
possibility of a new reward function r^; which (unlike the
function r deﬁned in (1)) depends on the chosen action a in
addition to the state x:
r^ x; að Þ ¼
λ αi -
βi
μi
 
; a ¼ i≠ 0; xi<ci;
λ αi -
βi xi + 1ð Þ
ciμi
 
; a ¼ i≠ 0; xi ⩾ ci;
0; a ¼ 0
8>><
>>:
(3)
The two reward functions in (1) and (3) look very different at
ﬁrst sight, but both formulations are entirely logical. The
original deﬁnition in (1) is based on the real-time holding costs
and rewards accrued during the system’s evolution, while the
alternative formulation in (3) is based on an unbiased estimate
of each individual customer’s contribution to the aggregate net
reward, made at the time of their entry to the system. We will
henceforth refer to the function r in (1) as the real-time reward
function, and the function r^ in (3) as the anticipatory reward
function. Our ﬁrst result proves algebraically that these two
reward formulations are equivalent.
Lemma 1 For any stationary policy θ we have:
gθ x; rð Þ ¼ gθ x; r^ð Þ (4)
where r and r^ are deﬁned as in (1) and (3) respectively.
That is, the long-run average net reward under θ is the
same under either reward formulation.
Proof We assume the existence of a stationary distribution
{πθ (x)}x∈S, where πθ (x) is the steady-state probability of
being in state x∈ S under the stationary policy θ and
∑x∈ S πθ(x)= 1. If no such distribution exists, then the
system is unstable under θ and both quantities in (4) are
inﬁnite. Under steady-state conditions, we can write:
gθ x; rð Þ ¼
X
x2S
πθ xð Þr xð Þ;
gθ x; r^ð Þ ¼
X
x2S
πθ xð Þr^ x; θ xð Þð Þ
noting, as before, that r^ (unlike r) has a dependence on the
action θ(x) associated with x. For each x∈ S, the steady-
state probability πθ(x) is the same under either reward
formulation since we are considering a ﬁxed stationary
policy. Our objective is to show:
X
x2S
πθ xð Þr xð Þ ¼
X
x2S
πθ xð Þr^ x; θ xð Þð Þ
We begin by partitioning the state space S into disjoint
subsets. For each facility i∈ {1, 2,…,N}, let Si denote the
(possibly empty) set of states at which the action chosen
under the policy θ is to join i. Then Si= Si− ∪ Si+ , where:
Si - :¼ x 2 S : θ xð Þ ¼ i and xi < cif g
Si + :¼ x 2 S : θ xð Þ ¼ i and xi ⩾ cif g
We also let S0 denote the set of states at which the action
chosen under θ is to balk. Now let gθ (x, r) and gθðx; r^Þ be
divided into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ constituents in the
following way:
g+θ x; rð Þ :¼
P
x2S
PN
i¼1
πθ xð Þmin xi; cið Þαiμi;
g-θ x; rð Þ :¼ -
P
x2S
PN
i¼1
πθ xð Þβixi;
g+θ x; r^ð Þ :¼ λ
PN
i¼1
P
x2Si
πθ xð Þαi;
g-θ x; r^ð Þ :¼ - λ
PN
i¼1
P
x2Si-
πθ xð Þ βiμi +
P
x2Si+
πθ xð Þ βiðxi + 1Þciμi
 !
By referring to (1) and (3), it can be checked that gθ(x,r)=
gθ
+(x, r) + gθ
−(x, r) and gθðx; r^Þ ¼ g +θ ðx; r^Þ + g -θ ðx; r^Þ:
It will be sufﬁcient to show that g +θ ðx; rÞ ¼ g+θ ðx; r^Þ and
g -θ ðx; rÞ ¼ g-θ ðx; r^Þ. Let Si,k⊆ Si (for k= 0, 1, 2,…) be the
set of states at which the action chosen under θ is to join
facility i, given that there are k customers present there.
That is:
Si;k :¼ fx 2 S : θðxÞ ¼ i and xi ¼ kg
Using the detailed balance equations for ergodic Markov
chains under steady-state conditions (see, eg, Cinlar, 1975)
we may assert that for every facility i and k⩾ 0, the total
ﬂow from all states x∈ S with xi= k up to states with
xi= k+1 must equal the total ﬂow from states with xi=
k+1 down to xi= k. Hence:
λ
X
x2Si;k
πθ xð Þ ¼
X
x2S
xi¼k + 1
πθ xð Þminðxi; ciÞμi (5)
Summing over all k 2 N0, we obtain:
λ
X
x2Si
πθ xð Þ ¼
X
x2S
πθ xð Þmin xi; cið Þμi (6)
which holds for i∈ {1, 2,…,N}. The physical interpreta-
tion of (6) is that, under steady-state conditions, the rate at
which customers join facility i is equal to the rate at which
service completions occur at i. Multiplying both sides of
(6) by αi and summing over i∈ {1, 2,…,N}, we have:
λ
XN
i¼1
X
x2Si
πθ xð Þαi ¼
XN
i¼1
X
x2S
πθ xð Þmin xi; cið Þαiμi
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which states that g +θ ðx; r^Þ ¼ g +θ ðx; rÞ as required.
It remains for us to show that g -θ ðx; r^Þ ¼ g -θ ðx; rÞ:
We proceed as follows: in (5) (which holds for all k 2 N0
and i∈ {1, 2, ..,N}), put k= ci to obtain:
λ
X
x2Si;ci
πθ xð Þ ¼
X
x2S
xi¼ci + 1
πθ xð Þciμi (7)
Suppose we multiply both sides of (7) by ci+1. Since the
sum on the left-hand side is over x 2 Si;ci and the sum on
the right-hand side is over states with xi= ci+1, this is
equivalent to multiplying each summand on the left-hand
side by xi+1 and each summand on the right-hand side by
xi. In addition, multiplying both sides by βi/(ciμi) yields:
λ
X
x2Si;ci
πθ xð Þ βi xi + 1ð Þciμi
¼
X
x2S
xi¼ci + 1
πθ xð Þβixi (8)
We can write similar expressions with k= ci+1, ci+2 and
so on. Recall that
S1
k¼ci Si;k ¼ Si + by deﬁnition. Hence, by
summing over all k⩾ ci in (8) we obtain:
λ
X
x2Si +
πθ xð Þ βi xi + 1ð Þciμi
¼
X
x2S
xi⩾ci + 1
πθ xð Þβixi (9)
Note also that multiplying both sides of (5) by βi/μi
and summing over all k< ci (and recalling that
Sci - 1
k¼0
Si;k ¼ Si - ) gives:
λ
X
x2Si -
πθ xð Þ βi
μi
¼
X
x2S
xi⩽ ci
πθ xð Þβixi (10)
Hence, from (9) and (10) we have:
λ
X
x2Si -
πθ xð Þ βi
μi
+
X
x2Si+
πθ xð Þ βi xi + 1ð Þciμi
 !
¼
X
x2S
πθ xð Þβixi
Summing over i∈ {1, 2,…,N} gives g -θ ðx; r^Þ ¼ g-θ ðx; rÞ
as required. We have already shown that g +θ ðx; r^Þ ¼
g+θ ðx; rÞ; so this completes the proof that gθðx; r^Þ ¼
gθðx; rÞ. □
It follows from Lemma 1 that any policy which is optimal
among stationary policies under one reward formulation (either
r or r^) is likewise optimal under the other formulation, with the
same long-run average reward. The interchangeability of these
two reward formulations will assist us in proving later results.
3. Containment of socially optimal policies
Let us deﬁne what we will refer to as ‘selﬁshly optimal’ and
‘socially optimal’ policies. The terminology used in this paper
is slightly incongruous to that which is typically found in the
literature on MDPs, and the main reason for this is that we wish
to draw analogies with the work of Naor (1969). The policies
which we describe as ‘socially optimal’ are those which satisfy
the well-known Bellman optimality equations of dynamic
programming (introduced by Bellman, 1957), and would be
referred to by many authors simply as ‘optimal’ policies; on the
other hand, the ‘selﬁshly optimal’ policies that we will describe
could alternatively be referred to as ‘greedy’ or ‘myopic’
policies.
We begin with selﬁshly optimal policies. Suppose that each
customer arriving in the system is allowed to make his or her
own decision (as opposed to being directed by a central
decision-maker). It is assumed throughout this work that the
queueing system is fully observable and therefore the customer
is able to observe the exact state of the system, including the
length of each queue and the occupancy of each facility (the
case of unobservable queues is a separate problem; see, eg, Bell
and Stidham, 1983; Haviv and Roughgarden, 2007; Shone et al,
2013). Under this scenario, a customer may calculate their
expected net reward (taking into account the expected cost of
waiting and the value of service) at each facility based on the
number of customers present there using a formula similar to
(3); if they act selﬁshly, they will simply choose the option
which maximizes this expected net reward. If the congestion
level of the system is such that all of these expected net rewards
are negative, we assume that the (selﬁsh) customer’s decision is
to balk. This deﬁnition of selﬁsh behaviour generalizes Naor’s
simple decision rule for deciding whether to join or balk in an
M/M/1 system. We note that since the FCFS queue discipline is
assumed at each facility, a selﬁsh customer’s behaviour
depends only on the existing state, and is not inﬂuenced by the
knowledge that other customers act selﬁshly.
Taking advantage of the ‘anticipatory’ reward formulation in
(3), we can deﬁne a selﬁshly optimal policy ~θ by:
~θðxÞ 2 arg max
a2f0;1;2;:::;Ng
r^ x; að Þ x 2 Sð Þ
In the case of ties, we assume that the customer joins the
facility with the smallest index i; however, balking is never
chosen over joining facility i when r^ðx; iÞ ¼ 0: This is in
keeping with Naor’s convention.
A socially optimal policy, denoted θ*, is any policy which
maximizes the long-run average net reward deﬁned in (2). The
optimality equations for our system, derived from the classical
Bellman optimality equations for average reward problems
(see, eg, Puterman, 1994) and assuming the real-time reward
formulation in (1), may be expressed as:
g* + h xð Þ ¼ r xð Þ + λmax
a
h xa +ð Þf g +
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμih xi -
 
+ 1 - λ -
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμi
 !
h xð Þ x 2 Sð Þ ð11Þ
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where h(x) is a relative value function and g* is the optimal
long-run average net reward. (We adopt the notational conven-
tion that x0+ = x to deal with the case where balking is optimal
in (11).) Under the anticipatory reward formulation in (3) these
optimality equations are similar except that r(x) is replaced by
r^ðx; aÞ, which must obviously be included within the maximi-
zation operator. Indeed, by adopting r^ðx; aÞ as our reward
formulation we may observe the fundamental difference
between the selﬁshly and socially optimal policies: the selﬁsh
policy simply maximizes the immediate reward r^ðx; aÞ, without
taking into account the extra term h(xa+ ); this is why it may be
called a myopic policy. The physical interpretation is that under
the selﬁsh policy, customers consider only the outcome to
themselves, without taking into account the implications for
future customers, who may suffer undesirable consequences as
a result of their behaviour.
In this work we assume an inﬁnite time horizon, but we use
the method of successive approximations (see Ross, 1983) to
treat the inﬁnite horizon problem as the limiting case of a ﬁnite
horizon problem. We therefore state the ﬁnite horizon optim-
ality equations corresponding to the inﬁnite horizon equations
in (11):
v*n + 1 xð Þ ¼ r xð Þ + λmaxa v
*
n x
a +ð Þ 	 + XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμiv*n xi -
 
+ 1 - λ -
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμi
 !
v*n xð Þ x 2 S; n⩾ 0ð Þ ð12Þ
where v*n(x) is the maximal expected total reward from a
problem with n time steps, given an initial state x∈ S (we deﬁne
v*0(x)= 0 for all x∈ S).
Remark It has already been shown (Lemma 1) that, in an
inﬁnite-horizon problem, a stationary policy earns the same
long-run average reward under either of the reward
formulations r and r^. However, this equivalence is lost
when we consider ﬁnite-horizon problems. Indeed, given a
ﬁnite horizon n, a policy which is optimal under reward
function r may perform extremely poorly under r^: This is
especially likely to be the case if n is small.
Given that selﬁsh customers refuse to choose facility i if
r^ðx; iÞ< 0; it follows that for i= 1, 2,…,N there exists an upper
threshold bi which represents the greatest possible number of
customers at i under steady-state conditions. The value bi can be
derived from (3) as:
bi :¼ ciαiμi
βi

 
where b  c denotes the integer part. Two important ways in
which the selﬁshly optimal policy ~θ differs from a socially
optimal policy are as follows:
1. The decisions made under ~θ are entirely independent of the
demand rate λ.
2. The threshold bi (representing the steady-state maximum
occupancy at i) is independent of the parameters for the other
facilities j≠i.
Because of the thresholds bi, a selﬁshly optimal policy ~θ
induces an ergodic Markov chain deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of
states ~S  S: Formally, we have:
~S :¼ x1; x2; :::; xNð Þ : xi ⩽ bi for all if g (13)
We will refer to ~S as the selﬁshly optimal state space.
Note that, due to the convention that the facility with the
smallest index i is chosen in the case of a tie between the
expected net rewards at two or more facilities, the selﬁshly
optimal policy ~θ is unique in any given problem. Changing
the ordering of the facilities (and thereby the tie-breaking
rules) affects the policy ~θ; but does not alter the boundaries
of ~S:
Let Sθ* denote the set of positive recurrent states belonging to
the Markov chain induced by a socially optimal policy θ*
satisfying the optimality equations in (11). The main result to be
proved in this section is that Sθ* is not only ﬁnite, but must also
be contained in ~S.
Example 1 Consider a system with demand rate λ= 12 and
only two facilities. The ﬁrst facility has two channels
available (c1= 2) and a service rate μ1= 5, holding cost
β1= 3 and ﬁxed reward α1= 1. The parameters for the
second facility are c2= 2, μ2= 1, β2= 3 and α2= 3, so it
offers a higher reward but a slower service rate. We can
uniformize the system by taking Δ= 1/24, so that
(λ+∑iciμi)Δ= 1. The selﬁshly optimal state space ~S for
this system consists of 12 states. Figure 3 shows the
Selfish Policy Social Policy
Figure 3 Selﬁshly and socially optimal policies for Example 1.
Note: For each state x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ 2 ~S, the corresponding decisions under the respective policies are shown.
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decisions taken at these states under the selﬁshly optimal
policy ~θ; and also the corresponding decisions taken under
a socially optimal policy θ*.
By comparing the tables in Figure 3 we may observe the
differences between the policies ~θ and θ*. At the states
(2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2) and (3, 1), the socially optimal policy
θ* deviates from the selﬁsh policy ~θ (incidentally, the sub-
optimality of the selﬁsh policy is about 22%). More striking,
however, is the fact that under the socially optimal policy,
some of the states in ~S are actually unattainable under
steady-state conditions. Indeed, the recurrent state space Sθ*
consists of only six states (enclosed by the bold rectangle in
the ﬁgure). Thus, for this system, Sθ*  ~S and in this
section we aim to prove that this result holds in general.
It is known that for a general MDP deﬁned on an inﬁnite set
of states, an average reward optimal policy need not exist, and
that even if such a policy exists, it may be non-stationary. In
1983, Ross provides counter-examples to demonstrate both of
these facts. Thus, it is desirable to establish the existence of an
optimal stationary policy before aiming to examine its proper-
ties. Our approach in this section is based on the results of
Sennott (1989), who has established sufﬁcient conditions for
the existence of an average reward optimal stationary policy for
anMDP deﬁned on an inﬁnite state space (this problem has also
been addressed by other authors; see, eg, Zijm, 1985; Cavazos-
Cadena, 1989). We will proceed to show that Sennott’s
conditions are satisﬁed for our system, and then deduce that
for any socially optimal policy θ*, Sθ* must be contained in ~S:
Sennott’s approach is based on the theory of discounted reward
problems, in which a reward earned n steps into the future is
discounted by a factor γn, where 0< γ< 1. A policy θ is said to
be γ-discount optimal if it maximizes the total expected
discounted reward (abbreviated henceforth as TEDR) over an
inﬁnite time horizon, deﬁned (for reward function r^) as:
vθ;γ x; r^ð Þ ¼ Eθ
X1
n¼0
γnr^ xn; anð Þ j x0 ¼ x
" #
x 2 Sð Þ (14)
Let θ*γ denote an optimal policy under discount rate γ, and let
v*γ ðx; r^Þ be the corresponding TEDR, so that v*γ ðx; r^Þ ¼
supθvθ;γðx; r^Þ: It is known that v*γ ðx; r^Þ satisﬁes the discount
optimality equations (see Puterman, 1994):
v*γ x; r^ð Þ ¼ maxa r^ x; að Þ + γ
X
y2S
pxy að Þv*γ y; r^ð Þ
( )
x 2 Sð Þ
We proceed to show that in our system, the discount optimal
value function v*γ satisﬁes conditions which are sufﬁcient for
the existence of an average reward optimal stationary policy.
In the proofs of the upcoming results, we adopt the anticipatory
reward function r^ deﬁned in (3).
Lemma 2 For every state x∈ S and discount rate 0< γ< 1:
v*γ x; r^ð Þ⩾ 0
Proof Let θ0 be the trivial policy of balking under every
state. Each reward r^ðxn; θ0ðxnÞÞ is zero and hence
vθ0;γðx; r^Þ ¼ 0. Since v*γðx; r^Þ ¼ supθvθ;γðx; r^Þ by deﬁni-
tion, the result follows. □
The next result establishes an important monotonicity prop-
erty of the function v*γðx; r^Þ which, incidentally, does not hold
for its counterpart v*γ ðx; rÞ under the real-time reward
formulation (1).
Lemma 3 For every state x∈ S, discount rate 0< γ< 1 and
facility i∈ {1, 2,…,N}, we have:
v*γ x
i + ; r^
 
⩽ v*γ x; r^ð Þ
Proof We rely on the ﬁnite horizon optimality equations (for
discounted problems) and prove the result using induction
on the number of stages. The ﬁnite horizon optimality
equations are:
v*γ;n + 1 x; r^ð Þ ¼ maxa r^ x; að Þ + γλv
*
γ;n x
a + ; r^ð Þ
n o
+ γ
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμiv*γ;n xi - ; r^
 "
+ 1 - λ -
XN
i¼1
min xi; cið Þμi
 !
v*γ;n x; r^ð Þ
#
x 2 S; n⩾ 0ð Þ ð15Þ
It is sufﬁcient to show that for each state x∈ S, discount
rate 0< γ< 1, facility i∈ {1, 2,…,N} and integer n⩾ 0:
v*γ;n x
i + ; r^
 
⩽ v*γ;n x; r^ð Þ (16)
We deﬁne v*γ;0ðx; r^Þ ¼ 0 for all x∈ S. In order to show
that (16) holds when n= 1, we need to show, for i=
1, 2,…,N:
max
a
r^ xi + ; a
 
⩽max
b
r^ x; bð Þ ðx 2 SÞ
Indeed, let a* 2 argmaxa r^ðxi + ; aÞ. It follows from the
deﬁnition of r^ðx; aÞ in (3) that r^ðxi + ; aÞ⩽ r^ðx; aÞ for any
ﬁxed action a and facility i. Hence:
max
a
r^ xi + ; a
  ¼ r^ xi + ; a* ⩽ r^ x; a* ⩽max
b
r^ x; bð Þ
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Now let us assume that (16) also holds for n= k,
where k⩾ 1 is arbitrary, and aim to show
v*γ;k + 1ðxi + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ;k + 1ðx; r^Þ. We have:
v*γ;k + 1 x
i + ; r^ð Þ - v*γ;k + 1 x; r^ð Þ
¼ max
a
r^ xi + ; a
 
+ γλv*γ;k x
i + a + ; r^ n o
- max
b
r^ x; bð Þ + γλv*γ;k xb + ; r^
 n o
+ γ
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μj v
*
γ;k x
i + j - ; r^  - v*γ;k xj - ; r^  
+ γ 1 - λ -
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μj
 !
v*γ;k x
i + ; r^
 
- v*γ;k x; r^ð Þ
 
- γI xi<cið Þμi v*γ;k xi + ; r^
 
- v*γ;k x; r^ð Þ
 
ð17Þ
Note that the indicator term in (17) arises because, under
state xi+ , there may (or may not) be one extra service
in progress at facility i, depending on whether or not
xi< ci. Recall that we assume λ+Σi= 1N ciμi= 1, hence
(1− λ−Σj= 1N min(xj,cj)μj− I(xi< ci)μi) must always be non-
negative. We also have v*γ;kðxi + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ;kðx; r^Þ and
v*γ;kððxi + Þj - ; r^Þ⩽v*γ;kðxj - ; r^Þ (for j= 1, 2,…,N) using our
inductive assumption of monotonicity at stage k. Hence, in
order to verify that (17) is non-positive, it sufﬁces to show:
max
a
r^ xi + ; a
 
+ γλv*γ;k x
i + a + ; r^ n o
⩽max
b
r^ x; bð Þ + γλv*γ;k xb + ; r^
 n o ð18Þ
Here, let a* be a maximizing action on the left-hand side,
that is
a* 2 arg max
a
r^ xi + ; a
 
+ γλv*γ;k x
i + a + ; r^ n o
By the monotonicity of r^ and our inductive assumption, we
have:
r^ xi + ; a*
 
⩽r^ x; a*
 
;
v*γ;k x
a* +
 i +
; r^
 
⩽v*γ;k x
a* + ; r^
 
Hence the left-hand side of (18) is bounded above by
r^ðx; a*Þ + γλv*γ;kðxa
* + ; r^Þ, which in turn is bounded above
by maxb r^ðx; bÞ + γλv*γ;kðxb + ; r^Þ
n o
. This shows that
v*γ;k + 1ðxi + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ;k + 1ðx; r^Þ, which completes the inductive
proof that (16) holds for all n 2 N. Using the method of
‘successive approximations’, Ross (1983) proves that
limn!1v*γ;nðx; r^Þ ¼ v*γðx; r^Þ for all x∈ S, and so we con-
clude that v*γðxi + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ ðx; r^Þ as required. □
We require another lemma to establish a state-dependent
lower bound for the relative value function h.
Lemma 4 For every x∈ S, there exists a value M(x)> 0 such
that, for every discount rate 0< γ< 1:
v*γ x; r^ð Þ - v*γ 0; r^ð Þ⩾ -M xð Þ
where 0 denotes the ‘empty system’ state, (0, 0,…, 0).
Proof Let αmax=maxi∈ {1, 2,…, N}αi denote the maximum
value of service across all facilities. For each discount
rate 0< γ< 1 and policy θ, let us deﬁne a new function
wθ,γ by:
wθ;γðx; r^Þ :¼ Eθ
X1
n¼0
γn r^ xn; anð Þ - λαmaxð Þ j x0 ¼ x
" #
x 2 Sð Þ
By comparison with the deﬁnition of vθ,γ in (14), we
have:
wθ;γ x; r^ð Þ ¼ vθ;γ x; r^ð Þ - λαmax1 - γ
and since the subtraction of a constant from each single-
step reward does not affect our optimality criterion, we
also have:
w*γ x; r^ð Þ ¼ v*γ x; r^ð Þ -
λαmax
1 - γ
(19)
where w*γ ðx; r^Þ ¼ supθwθ;γðx; r^Þ. By the deﬁnition of r^ in
(3) it can be checked that r^ðx; aÞ⩽λαmax for all state-
action pairs (x, a). Therefore w*γðx; r^Þ is a sum of non-
positive terms and must be non-positive itself. Further-
more, w*γ is the TEDR function for a new MDP which is
identical to our original MDP except that we replace each
r^ðxn; anÞ (for n= 0, 1, 2,…) by r^ðxn; anÞ - λαmax. Thus,
w*γ satisﬁes:
w*γðx; r^Þ ¼maxa r^ðx; aÞ - λαmax + γ
X
y2S
pxyðaÞw*γ ðy; r^Þ
( )
ðx 2 SÞ ð20Þ
Consider x= 0i+ , for an arbitrary i∈ {1, 2,…,N}. Using
(20) we have, for all actions a:
w*γ 0
i + ; r^
 
⩾r^ 0i + ; a
 
- λαmax + γ
X
y2S
p0i + ;y að Þw*γ y; r^ð Þ
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In particular, if the action a= 0 is to balk then r^ð0i + ; aÞ ¼
0 and the only possible transitions are to states 0 or 0i+ .
Hence:
w*γ 0
i + ; r^
 
⩾ - λαmax + γμiw*γ 0; r^ð Þ + γ 1 - μið Þw*γ 0i + ; r^
 
Then, since γ⩽ 1 and by the non-positivity of w*γð0; r^Þ and
w*γð0i + ; r^Þ:
w*γ 0
i + ; r^
 
⩾ - λαmax + μiw*γ 0; r^ð Þ + 1 - μið Þw*γ 0i + ; r^
 
(21)
From (19) and (21) we derive:
v*γ 0
i + ; r^
 
- v*γ 0; r^ð Þ ¼ w*γ 0i + ; r^
 
-w*γ 0; r^ð Þ⩾ -
λαmax
μi
(22)
so we have a lower bound for v*γ ð0i + ; r^Þ - v*γ ð0; r^Þ which
is independent of γ as required. We need to show that
for each x∈ S, a lower bound can be found for
v*γðx; r^Þ - v*γð0; r^Þ. Let us form a hypothesis as follows:
for each state x∈ S, there exists a value ψ(x) such that, for
all γ:
v*γ x; r^ð Þ - v*γ 0; r^ð Þ⩾ - λαmaxψðxÞ (23)
We have ψ(0)= 0 and, from (22), ψ(0i+ )= μi
− 1 for i= 1,-
2,…,N. Let us aim to show that (23) holds for an
arbitrary x≠0, under the assumption that for all j∈ {1, 2,-
…,N} with xj⩾ 1, (23) holds for the state xj−. Using
similar steps to those used for 0i + earlier, we have:
w*γ x; r^ð Þ⩾ - λαmax + γ
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μjw
*
γ x
j - ; r^
 
+ γ 1 -
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μj
 !
w*γ x; r^ð Þ
and hence:
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μj w
*
γ x; r^ð Þ -w*γ xj - ; r^
  
⩾ - λαmax
Then, using our inductive assumption that, for each
j∈ {1,2,…,N}, w*γ ðxj - ; r^Þ -w*γ ð0; r^Þ is bounded below
by− λαmaxψ(x
j− ):
w*γ x; r^ð Þ -w*γ 0; r^ð Þ⩾ - λαmax
1 +
PN
j¼1 min xj; cj
 
μjψ x
j -ð ÞPN
j¼1 min xj; cj
 
μj
 !
(24)
Using (19), we conclude that the right-hand side of (24) is
also a lower bound for v*γðxj - ; r^Þ - v*γ ð0; r^Þ. Therefore we
can deﬁne:
ψ xð Þ :¼ 1 +
PN
j¼1 min xj; cj
 
μjψ x
j -ð ÞPN
j¼1 min xj; cj
 
μj
with the result that v*γ ðx; r^Þ - v*γ ð0; r^Þ is bounded below by
an expression which depends only on the system input
parameters λ, αmax and the service rates μ1, μ2,…, μN as
required. Using an inductive procedure, we can derive a
lower bound of this form for every x∈ S. □
Lemma 5 For all states x∈S and actions a∈ {0, 1, 2,…,N}:X
y2S
pxyðaÞMðyÞ<1
Where−M(y) is the lower bound for v*γðy; r^Þ - v*γ ð0; r^Þ
derived in Lemma 4.
Proof This is immediate from Lemma 4 since, for any x∈ S,
the number of ‘neighbouring’ states y that can be reached
via a single transition from x is ﬁnite (regardless of the
action chosen), and eachM(y) is ﬁnite. □
The results presented in this section thus far conﬁrm that our
system satisﬁes Sennott’s (1989) conditions for the existence of
an average reward optimal stationary policy. We now state this
as a theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider a sequence of discount rates (γn)
converging to 1, with ðθ*γnÞ the associated sequence of
discount-optimal stationary policies. There exists a subse-
quence (ηn) of (γn) such that the limit
θ* :¼ lim
n!1 θ
*
ηn
exists, and the stationary policy θ* is average reward
optimal. Furthermore, the policy θ* yields an average
reward g* ¼ limγ"1ð1 - γÞv*γðxÞ which, together with a
function h(x), satisﬁes the optimality equations:
g* + hðxÞ ¼ max
a
r^ðx; aÞ +
X
y2S
pxyðaÞhðyÞ
( )
ðx 2 SÞ
ð25Þ
Proof We refer to Sennott (1989), who presents four assump-
tions which (together) are sufﬁcient for the existence of an
average reward optimal stationary policy in an MDP with
an inﬁnite state space. From Lemma 2 we have v*γ ðx; r^Þ⩾0
for every x∈ S and γ∈ (0,1), so a stronger version of
Assumption 1 in Sennott (1989) holds. From Lemma 3 we
have v*γ ðxi + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ ðx; r^Þ for all x, i∈ {1, 2,…,N} and γ,
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which implies v*γ ðx; r^Þ - v*γ ð0; r^Þ⩽0 using an inductive
argument. Therefore Assumption 2 in Sennott (1989) also
holds. Assumptions 3 and 3* in Sennott (1989) follow
directly from Lemmas 4 and 5. □
Our next result establishes the containment property of
socially optimal policies which we alluded to earlier in this
section.
Theorem 2 There exists a stationary policy θ* which satisﬁes
the average reward optimality equations and which
induces an ergodic Markov chain on some ﬁnite set Sθ* of
states contained in ~S.
Informally, we say ‘the socially optimal state space is
contained within the selﬁshly optimal state space’.
Proof From the deﬁnition of ~S in (13) we note that it is
sufﬁcient to show that for some stationary optimal policy
θ*, the action θ*(x) prescribed under state x∈ S is never to
join facility i when xi= bi (i= 1, 2,…,N). The policy θ*
described in Theorem 1 is obtained as a limit of the
discount-optimal stationary policies ðθ*ηnÞ. It follows that
for every state x∈ S there exists an integer U(x) such that
θ*ðxÞ ¼ θ*ηnðxÞ for all n⩾U(x), and therefore it sufﬁces to
show that for any discount rate 0< γ< 1, the discount-
optimal policy θ*γ forbids joining facility i under states x
with xi= bi. For a contradiction, suppose xi= bi and
θ*γ(x)= 1 for some state x, facility i and discount rate γ.
Then the discount optimality equations in (15) imply:
r^ x; ið Þ + γλv*γ xi + ; r^
 
⩾γλv*γ x; r^ð Þ (26)
that is, joining i is preferable to balking at state x. Given
that xi= bi, we have r^ðx; iÞ<0 and therefore (26) implies
v*γðxi + ; r^Þ>v*γ ðx; r^Þ, but this contradicts the result of
Lemma 3. □
Having shown that some socially optimal policy exists which
induces a Markov chain with a positive recurrent class of states
contained in ~S, we proceed to show that, in fact, any socially
optimal policy has this property.
Lemma 6 Any stationary policy θ* which maximizes the
long-run average reward deﬁned in (2) induces an ergodic
Markov chain on some set of states contained in ~S.
Proof Suppose, for a contradiction, that we have a stationary
policy θ which maximizes (2) and θðxÞ ¼ i for some state
x 2 S with xi ¼ bi and πθðxÞ>0. We proceed using a
sample path argument. We start two processes at an
arbitrary state x0∈ S and apply policy θ to the ﬁrst process,
which follows path x(t). Let (x(t), t) denote the state-time
of the system. Since θ is stationary, we may abbreviate
θ(x(t), t) to θ(x(t)). We also apply a non-stationary policy
ϕ to the second process, which follows path y(t). The policy
ϕ operates as follows: it chooses the same actions as θ at all
times, unless the ﬁrst process is in state x, in which case ϕ
chooses to balk instead of joining facility i. In notation:
ϕðyðtÞ; tÞ ¼
θ x tð Þð Þ if x tð Þ≠ x;
0 otherwise
(
Initially, x(0)=y(0)=x0. Let t1 denote the ﬁrst time, during
the system’s evolution, that the ﬁrst process is in state x. At
this point the process earns a negative reward r^ðx; iÞ by
choosing action i; meanwhile, the second process earns a
reward of zero by choosing to balk. An arrival may or may
not occur at t1; if it does, the ﬁrst process acquires an extra
customer, and if not, both processes remain in state x (but
nevertheless, due to the reward formulation in (3), the
second process earns a greater reward at time t1). Let u1
denote the time of the next visit (after time t1) of the ﬁrst
process to the regenerative state 0. In the interval (t1, u1], the
ﬁrst process may acquire a certain number of extra custo-
mers at facility i (possibly more than one) in comparison to
the second process due to further arrivals occurring under
state x. Throughout the interval (t1, u1], x(t) dominates y(t)
in the sense that every facility has at least as many customers
present under x(t) as under y(t). Consequently, at time u1 or
earlier, the processes are coupled again. At each of the time
epochs t1 + 1, t1 + 2,…, u1 we note that the reward earned by
the ﬁrst process cannot possibly exceed the reward earned
by the second process; this is because the presence of extra
customers at facility i results in either a smaller reward (if
facility i is chosen) or an equal reward (if a different facility,
or balking, is chosen). Therefore the total reward earned by
the ﬁrst process up until time u1 is smaller than that earned
by the second process.
Using similar arguments, we can say that if t2 denotes
the time of the next visit (after u1) of the ﬁrst process to
state x, the second process must earn a greater total
reward than the ﬁrst process in the interval (t2, u2], where
u2 is the time of the next visit (after t2) of the ﬁrst process
to state 0. Given that πθðxÞ>0, the state x is visited
inﬁnitely often. Hence, by repetition of this argument,
it is easy to see that θ is strictly inferior to the non-
stationary policy ϕ in terms of expected long-run
average reward. We know (by Theorem 1) that an optimal
stationary policy exists, so there must be another station-
ary policy which is superior to θ. □
Theorem 1 may be regarded as a generalisation of a famous
result which is due to Naor. In 1969, Naor shows (in the context
of a singleM/M/1 queue) that the selﬁshly optimal and socially
optimal strategies are both threshold strategies, with thresholds
ns and no, respectively, and that no⩽ ns. This is the M/M/1
version of the containment property which we have proved for
multiple, heterogeneous facilities (each with multiple service
channels allowed). We also note that Theorem 1 assures us of
being able to ﬁnd a socially optimal policy by searching within
the class of stationary policies which remain ‘contained’ in the
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ﬁnite set ~S. This means that we can apply the established
techniques of dynamic programming (eg, value iteration, policy
improvement) by restricting the state space so that it only
includes states in ~S; any policy that would take us outside ~S can
be ignored, since we know that such a policy would be sub-
optimal. For example, when implementing value iteration, we
loop over all states in ~S on each iteration and simply restrict the
set of actions so that joining facility i is not allowed at any state
x with xi= bi. This ‘capping’ technique enables us to avoid
the use of alternative techniques which have been proposed in
the literature for searching for optimal policies on inﬁnite state
spaces (see, eg, the method of ‘approximating sequences’
proposed by Sennott (1991), or Ha’s (1997) method of
approximating the limiting behaviour of the value function).
4. Comparison with unobservable systems
The results proved in Section 3 bear certain analogies to results
which may be proved for systems of unobservable queues, in
which routing decisions are made independently of the state of
the system. In this section we brieﬂy discuss the case of
unobservable queues, in order to draw comparisons with the
observable case. Comparisons between selﬁshly and socially
optimal policies in unobservable queueing systems have
already received considerable attention in the literature (see,
eg, Littlechild, 1974; Edelson and Hildebrand, 1975; Bell and
Stidham, 1983; Haviv and Roughgarden, 2007; Knight and
Harper, 2013).
Consider a multiple-facility queueing system with a formula-
tion identical to that given in Section 2, but with the added
stipulation that the action an chosen at time step n must be
selected independently of the system state xn. In effect, we
assume that the system state is hidden from the decision-maker.
Furthermore, the decision-maker lacks the ability to ‘guess’ the
state of the system based on the waiting times of customers who
have already passed through the system, and must simply
assign customers to facilities according to a vector of routing
probabilities (p1, p2,…, pN) which remains constant over time.
We assume that Σi= 1N pi⩽ 1, where pi is the probability of
routing a customer to facility i. Hence, p0≔1−Σi= 1N pi is the
probability that a customer will be rejected.
Naturally, the arrival process at facility i∈ {1, 2,…,N}
under a randomized admission policy is a Poisson process with
demand rate λi:= λpi, where (as before) λ is the demand rate for
the system as a whole. Let gi(λi) denote the expected average
net reward per unit time at facility i, given that it operates with a
Poisson arrival rate λi. Then:
gi λið Þ ¼ λiαi - βiLi λið Þ (27)
where Li(λi) is the expected number of customers present at i
under demand rate λi. In this context, a socially optimal
policy is a vector (λ*1, λ*2,…, λ*N) which maximizes the sum
Σi= 1N gi(λ*i). On the other hand, a selﬁshly optimal policy is a
vector ð~λ1;~λ2; :::;~λNÞ which causes the system to remain in
equilibrium, in the sense that no self-interested customer has an
incentive to deviate from the randomized policy in question (see
Bell and Stidham, 1983, p 834). More speciﬁcally, individual
customers make decisions according to a probability distribu-
tion f~pig (where λ~pi ¼ ~λi for each i∈ {1, 2,…,N}) and, in
order for equilibrium to be maintained, it is necessary for all of
the actions chosen with non-zero probability to yield the same
expected net reward.
First of all, it is worth making the point that no theoretical
upper bound exists for the number of customers who may be
present at any individual facility i under a Poisson demand rate
λi which is independent of the system state (unless, of course,
λi= 0). Indeed, standard results for M/M/c queues (see Gross
and Harris, 1998, p 69) imply that the steady-state probability of
n customers being present at a facility with a positive demand
rate is positive for each n⩾ 0. As such, the positive recurrent
state spaces under the selﬁshly and socially optimal policies are
both unbounded in the unobservable case, and there is no
prospect of being able to prove a ‘containment’ result similar to
that of Theorem 2. However, it is straightforward to prove an
alternative result involving the total effective admission rates
under the two policies which is consistent with the general
theme of socially optimal policies generating ‘less busy’
systems than their selﬁsh counterparts.
Figure 4 illustrates the general shapes of the expected net
reward for an individual customer (henceforth denoted wi(λi))
and the expected long-run average reward gi(λi) as functions of
the Poisson queue-joining rate λi at an individual facility i.
Naturally, wi(λi) is a strictly decreasing function of λi and,
assuming that the demand rate for the system is sufﬁciently
large, the joining rate at facility i under an equilibrium (selﬁsh)
policy is the unique value ~λi which equates wi(λi) to zero.
Indeed, if this were not the case, then a selﬁsh customer would
deviate from the equilibrium policy by choosing to join the
queue with probability 1 (if wi(λi) was positive) or balk with
probability 1 (if wi(λi) was negative). On the other hand, it is
known from the queueing theory literature (see Grassmann,
1983; Lee and Cohen, 1983) that the expected queue length
Li(λi) is a strictly convex function of λi, and hence the function
gi(λi) in (27) is strictly concave in λi. Under a socially optimal
policy, the joining rate at facility i is the unique value λ*i which
maximizes gi(λi) (assuming, once again, that the demand rate
Demand
rate at i 
Individual's expected net reward
Expected long-run average net reward
0
*λi
~λi
Figure 4 The general shapes of wi(λi) and gi(λi) as functions of λi.
Rob Shone et al—Containment of socially optimal policies in multiple-facility Markovian queueing systems 11
for the system as a whole is large enough to permit this ﬂow of
trafﬁc at facility i).
It is worth noting that the theory of non-atomic routing
games (see Roughgarden, 2005) assures us that the equili-
brium and socially optimal policies both exist and are unique.
This allows a simple argument to be formed in order to show
that the sum of the joining rates at the individual facilities
under a socially optimal policy (let us denote this by η*)
cannot possibly exceed the corresponding sum under an
equilibrium policy (denoted ~ηÞ. Indeed, it is clear that if the
system demand rate λ is sufﬁciently large, then the selﬁshly
and socially optimal joining rates at any individual facility i
will attain their ‘ideal’ values ~λi and λ*i (as depicted in
Figure 4), respectively, and so in this case it follows trivially
that η*⩽ ~η. On the other hand, suppose that λ is not large
enough to permit wi(λi)= 0 for all facilities i. In this case,
wi(λi) must be strictly positive for some facility i, and
therefore the probability of a customer balking under an
equilibrium strategy is zero (since balking is unfavourable in
comparison to joining facility i). Hence, one has ~η ¼ λ in this
case, and since η* is also bounded above by λ the result η*⩽ ~η
follows.
The conclusion of this section is that, while the ‘containment’
property of observable systems proved in Section 3 does not
have an exact analogue in the unobservable case, the general
principle that selﬁsh customers create ‘busier’ systems still
persists (albeit in a slightly different guise).
5. Heterogeneous customers
An advantage of the anticipatory reward formulation in (3)
is that it enables the results from Section 3 to be extended to
a scenario involving heterogeneous customers without a
re-description of the state space S being required. Suppose
we have M⩾ 2 customer classes, and customers of the
ith class arrive in the system via their own independent
Poisson process with demand rate λi (i= 1, 2, ..,M). In this
case we assume, without loss of generality, that ∑iλi +
∑jcjμj= 1. For convenience we will deﬁne λ:=∑iλi as the
total demand rate. We allow the holding costs and ﬁxed
rewards in our model (but not the service rates) to depend
on these customer classes; that is, the ﬁxed reward for
serving a customer of class i at facility j is now αij, and the
holding cost (per unit time) is βij. Various physical inter-
pretations of this model are possible; for example, suppose
we have a healthcare system in which patients arrive from
various different geographical locations. Then the para-
meters αij and βij may be conﬁgured according to the
distance of service provider j from region i (among other
factors), so that patients’ commuting costs are taken into
account.
Suppose we wanted to use a ‘real-time’ reward formulation,
similar to (1), for the reward r(⋅) in our extended model. Then
the system state would need to include information about the
classes of customers in service at each facility, and also the total
number of customers of each class waiting in each queue.
However, using an ‘anticipatory’ reward formulation, we can
allow the state space representation to be the same as before;
that is, S ¼ fx ¼ ðx1; x2; :::; xNÞ : x1; x2; :::; xN 2 N0g, where
xj is simply the number of customers present (irrespective of
class) at facility j, for j= 1, 2,…,N. On the other hand, the set
of actions A available at each state x∈ S has a more complicated
representation. We now deﬁne A as follows:
A ¼ a ¼ a1; a2; :::; aMð Þ : a1; a2; :::; aM 2 0; 1; :::;Nf gf g
That is, the action a is a vector which prescribes, for each
customer class i∈ {1, 2,…,M}, the destination ai of any
customer of class i who arrives at the present epoch of time,
with the system having been uniformized so that it evolves
in discrete time steps of size Δ= (∑iλi+∑jcjμj)− 1. The reward
r^ðx; aÞ for taking action a∈A at state x is then:
r^ x; að Þ ¼
XM
i¼1
r^i x; aið Þ
where ai is the i
th component of a, and:
r^iðx; aiÞ :¼
λi αij -
βij
μj
 
; ai ¼ j≠ 0; xj<cj
λi αij -
βijðxj + 1Þ
cjμj
 
; ai ¼ j≠ 0; xj⩾cj
0; ai ¼ 0
8>><
>>:
for i= 1, 2…,M. We note that expanding the action set in
this manner is not the only possible way of formulating our
new model (with heterogeneous customers) as an MDP, but it
is the natural extension of the formulation adopted in the
previous section. An alternative approach would be to
augment the state space so that information about the class
of the most recent customer to arrive is included in the state
description; actions would then need to be chosen only at
arrival epochs, and these actions would simply be integers in
the set {0, 1,…, N} as opposed to vectors (see Puterman,
1994, p 568) for an example involving admission control in
an M/M/1 queue). By keeping the state space S unchanged,
however, we are able to show that the results of Section 3 can
be generalized very easily.
Under our new formulation, the discount optimality equa-
tions (using the anticipatory reward functions r^i) are as
follows:
v*γ x; r^ð Þ ¼
XM
i¼1
max
ai2A
r^i x; aið Þ + γλiv*γ xai + ; r^ð Þ
n o
+ γ
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μjv
*
γ x
j - ; r^
 "
+ 1 - λ -
XN
j¼1
min xj; cj
 
μj
 !
v*γ x; r^ð Þ
#
ð28Þ
Note that the maximization in (28) can be carried
out in a componentwise fashion, so that instead of having
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to ﬁnd the maximizer among all vectors a in A (of which
the total number is (N+1)M), we can simply ﬁnd, for each
customer class i∈M, the ‘marginal’ action ai which maximizes
r^iðx; aiÞ + γλiv*γ ðxai + ; r^Þ. This can be exploited in the imple-
mentation of dynamic programming algorithms (eg, value
iteration), so that computation times increase only in proportion
to the number of customer classesM.
As before, we deﬁne the selﬁshly optimal policy to be the
policy under which the action chosen for each customer arriving
in the system is the action which maximizes r^iðx; aiÞ (obviously
this action now depends on the customer class). A selﬁsh
customer of class i accepts service at facility j if and only if,
prior to joining, the number xj of customers at facility j, satisﬁes
xj⩽ bij, where:
bij :¼
cjαijμj
βij
$ %
Consequently, under steady-state conditions, the number of
customers present at facility j is bounded above by maxibij.
It follows that we now have the following deﬁnition for the
selﬁshly optimal state space ~S:
~S :¼ ðx1; x2; :::; xNÞ : xj⩽max
i
bij; j ¼ 1; 2; :::;N
 
Example 2 We modify Example 1 from earlier so that there
are now two classes of customer, with demand rates
λ1= 12 and λ2= 10 respectively. The ﬁrst class has the
same cost and reward parameters as in Example 1; that is,
β11= 3, α11= 1 (for the ﬁrst facility) and β12= 3, α12= 3
(for the second facility). The second class of customer
has steeper holding costs and a much greater value of
service at the second facility: β21= β22= 5, α21= 1,
α22= 12. Both facilities have two service channels and the
service rates μ1= 5 and μ2= 1 remain independent of
customer class. We take Δ= (∑iλi+∑jcjμj)− 1= 1/34 to
uniformize the system.
We have previously seen that customers of the ﬁrst class
acting selﬁshly will cause the system state to remain
within a set of 12 states under steady-state conditions,
with x1⩽ 3 and x2⩽ 2 at all times. The incorporation
of a second class of customer has no effect on the
selﬁsh decisions made by the ﬁrst class of customer, so
(as shown in Figure 5) these decisions remain the same
as shown in Figure 3 previously. The ﬁrst table in
Figure 5 shows that selﬁsh customers of the second
class are unwilling to join the ﬁrst facility when x1⩾ 2;
however, under certain states they will choose to join
the second facility when x2= 3 (but never when x2> 3).
As a result, the selﬁsh state space ~S is expanded from 12
states to 20.
Figure 5 shows that the new selﬁsh state space ~S may be
represented diagrammatically as the smallest rectangle
which encompasses both ~S1 and ~S2, where (for i= 1, 2)
we have deﬁned:
~Si :¼ x1; x2; :::; xNð Þ : xj⩽bij; j ¼ 1; 2; :::;N
 	
It is somewhat interesting to observe that ~S includes states in
the ‘intersection of complements’ ~Sc1\~Sc2. These states would
not occur (under steady-state conditions) if the system
operated with only a single class of customer of either type,
but they do occur with both customer types present.
The policy θ* depicted in the second table in Figure 5 has
been obtained using value iteration, and illustrates the
containment property for systems with heterogeneous cus-
tomer classes. It may easily be seen that the socially optimal
state space Sθ* consists of only 9 states; under steady-state
conditions, the system will remain within this smaller class
of states. We also observe that, unlike the selﬁsh decisions,
the socially optimal decisions for a particular class of
customer are affected by the decisions made by the other
class of customer (as can be seen, in the case of the ﬁrst
customer class, by direct comparison with Figure 3 from
Example 1). Indeed, under θ*, customers of the ﬁrst class
never join Facility 2, and customers of the second class
never join Facility 1.
It can be veriﬁed that the results of Lemmas 2–5, Theorems
1–2 and Lemma 6 apply to the model with heterogeneous
customers, with only small modiﬁcations required to the proofs.
For example, in Lemma 3 we prove the inequality
v*γðxj + ; r^Þ⩽v*γ ðx; r^Þ by showing that, for all classes i∈ {1, 2,
…,M} and facilities j∈ {1, 2,…,N}, we have:
max
ai
r^i xj + ; ai
 
+ γλiv*γ;k x
j + ai + ; r^ n o
⩽max
bi
r^i x; bið Þ + γλiv*γ;k xbi + ; r^
 n o
for all k 2 N0. In Lemma 4, we can deﬁne αmax=maxi,jαij and
establish a lower bound for w*γ ð0j + ; r^Þ -w*γ ð0; r^Þ similar to (22)
Selfish Policy
Social Policy
Figure 5 Selﬁshly and socially optimal policies for Example 2.
Note: At each state x= (x1, x2), the corresponding decision vector
a= (a1, a2) is shown.
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by writing r^ð0j + ; 0Þ and p0j + ;yð0Þ instead of r^ð0j + ; 0Þ and
p0j+ ;yð0Þ respectively (so that the action at state 0j+ is the zero
vector 0, ie all customer classes balk); the rest of the inductive
proof goes through using similar adjustments. Theorem 2 holds
because if Sθ* was not contained in ~S, then the discount
optimality equations would imply, for some i∈ {1, 2,…,M}
and j∈ {1, 2,…,N}:
r^i x; jð Þ + γλiv*γ xj + ; r^
 
⩾γλiv*γ x; r^ð Þ
with r^iðx; jÞ<0, thus contradicting the result of (the modiﬁed)
Lemma 3. The sample path argument in Lemma 6 can be applied
to a customer of any class, with only trivial adjustments needed.
6. Conclusions
The principle that selﬁsh users create busier systems is well-
observed in the literature on behavioural queueing theory.
While this principle is interesting in itself, we also believe that
it has the potential to be utilized much more widely in
applications. As we have demonstrated, the search for a socially
optimal policy may be greatly simpliﬁed by reducing the search
space according to the bounds of the corresponding ‘selﬁsh’
policy, so that the methods of dynamic programming can be
more easily employed.
Our results in this paper hold for an arbitrary number of
facilities N, and (in addition) the results in Section 5 hold for an
arbitrary number of customer classesM. This lack of restriction
makes the results powerful from a theoretical point of view, but
we must also point out that in practice, the ‘curse of dimension-
ality’ often prohibits the exact computation of optimal policies
in large-scale systems, even when the state space can be
assumed ﬁnite. This problem could be partially addressed if
certain structural properties (eg monotonicity properties) of
socially optimal policies could be proved with the same level
of generality as our ‘containment’ results. It can be shown
trivially that selﬁsh policies are monotonic in various respects
(eg, balking at the state x implies balking at state xj+ , for any
facility j) and, indeed, the optimality of monotone policies is a
popular theme in the literature, although in our experience these
properties are usually not trivial to prove for an arbitrary
number of facilities. In future work, we intend to investigate
how the search for socially optimal policies can be further
simpliﬁed by exploiting their theoretical structure.
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